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Abstract. We study an endogenous stochastic growth model whose dynamic evolution is determined 
by an adaptive learning process defining the accumulation of technological knowledge within 
countries. Both the assimilation of technological knowledge and the arrival rate of innovations 
depend on the technological development level of countries. We illustrate how heterogeneous levels 
of technological development provide laggard countries with insufficient innovation incentives, 
leading to divergences in total factor productivity and their technological stagnation. The model is 
simulated numerically using data from the current Innovation Union Scoreboard where the main 
expected growth patterns of the Baltic States are compared to those of the reference innovators 
within the European Union area. 
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Introduction
The introduction and assimilation of new technologies by firms and countries, as well as their 
innovation and manufacturing processes, require the existence of a skilled labor force and a 
developed technological infrastructure or national system of innovation. This infrastructure, 
whose quality is determined, among others, by the existence of techno-economic webs and 
industrial districts (Furman et al. 2002), limits the ability of firms and countries to innovate 
and learn through manufacturing, since it must develop simultaneously to the knowledge 
acquired by workers in order to be implemented efficiently (López et al. 2011). Such a con-
straint implies that innovation and manufacturing require both a continuous learning process 
among workers as well as the existence of a solid technological base at the country level. In 
particular, when dealing with technological diffusion processes, it is generally understood 
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that knowledge does not flow immediately among workers, firms and countries but diffuses 
following an endogenously determined sigmoid accumulation function.
The processes of technological development and economic growth require the building 
of absorptive capacities in order for countries to master any imported technological knowl-
edge. The absorptive capacity of countries is based mainly on their learning capacity, which, 
at the same time, depends on the quantity and quality of the R&D performed and their 
stock of human capital (Niosi 2010). It should be noted that the evolution of technological 
development is quite a complex process as it simultaneously involves economic, social, and 
managerial actors (Magruk 2011). Examples of this type of processes can be found in the 
literature at different levels of disaggregation such as the organizational (Domijan, M., Dom-
ijan, E. 2008), cluster (Zeng et al. 2010), and industry (Castellacci 2006), ones. The complex 
nature of technological knowledge and its diffusion dynamics have also been widely studied 
[and verified] by evolutionary economists (Silverberg et al. 1988; Chiaromonte et al. 1993; 
Patel, Pavitt 1998). Refer to Fagerberg et al. (2005) and Hanusch and Pyka (2007) for recent 
reviews of the literature on this topic.
Moreover, long run financial consequences usually follow from the processes of tech-
nological development and economic growth, see Pilinkus (2010) for an illustration of this 
phenomenon among the Baltic States. In this sense, the financial sector complements the 
cumulative pattern of innovation activities, where differences in innovation strategies among 
firms and countries determine their probability to repeatedly innovate (Clausen et al. 2012). 
Similarly, the access to market-based finance has been shown to be beneficial for the gen-
eration and development of technological activities among small and medium sized enter-
prises (Wang, Shen 2007). This is particularly important when considering catching-up and 
technology learning processes, since, in most cases, catching-up cannot be fulfilled in one 
technology lifecycle and technological  paradigms shift faster with the progress of science 
and technology (Li, Wu 2002). 
In the same way, several cross-country studies have illustrated a virtuous circle in which 
R&D spending, innovation, productivity, and per capita income mutually reinforce each 
other and lead countries to long-term sustained growth rates (Hall, Jones 1999; Rouvinen 
2002; Aghion, Howitt 2007). At the firm level, there is evidence showing the positive links 
between R&D, innovation, and productivity for industrialized countries (Griffith et al. 2004; 
OECD 2009; Castellacci, Zheng 2010; Mairesse, Mohnen 2010). That is, firms investing in 
knowledge are generally more able to introduce new technological advances and those that 
innovate have greater labor productivity than those that do not. The resulting increments 
in productivity highlight the importance of innovation in enabling firms to improve their 
economic performance and catch up. In particular, several empirical analysis illustrate how 
technological innovations, both product and process, lead to superior economic performance 
among European firms (Loof, Heshmati 2002; Mohnen et al. 2006; Van Leeuwen, Klomp 
2006). 
When dealing with the evidence regarding the ability of firms to transform R&D into 
innovation in developing economies, the results are much more mixed than in the case of 
firms in industrialized countries (Silva, Teixeira 2011). A positive relation between R&D, 
innovation, and productivity has been found for newly industrialized Asian countries, see 
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Crespi and Zuniga (2012) for a review of the literature. These authors also illustrate how the 
Latin American evidence is much more mixed, which may result from the biased speciali-
zation of several of these countries in favor of industries featuring low domestic knowledge 
generation (Cimoli, Katz 2003). The development of knowledge-based economies and 
technological innovations within the Eastern European region has also led to mixed results, 
see Huggins and Strakova (2012) for the Balkan Peninsula, Svetlicic et al. (2007) for several 
Central European countries, and Masso and Vather (2008) for Estonia. 
The importance of human capital accumulation as a source of economic growth within 
a technological oriented environment has been repeatedly emphasized in the economic 
literature (Olsson 2005; Gupta, Chakraborty 2006; Arcalean et al. 2012). The European ex-
perience is documented both for technological leaders such a Sweden (Ballot, Taymaz 1997), 
and transitional economies like Croatia (Skare 2011). A wider perspective is provided by 
Fagerberg et al. (1997), who illustrate how innovation and the diffusion of technology were 
indeed essential factors behind the European growth of the 1980s. However, due to a lack 
of own R&D capabilities, most poor regions failed to take advantage of the more advanced 
technologies available elsewhere. As a result, economic growth in the poorer regions was not 
substantially faster than in the richer ones, where growth was triggered by much larger R&D 
efforts and a more advanced industrial structure. 
The current paper concentrates on the effects that the assimilation of technological 
knowledge and the innovation incentives that result from it have for the economic growth 
of countries. Countries [and the firms located within them] will be assumed to assimilate 
the knowledge implicit in innovations through an adaptive learning process determining 
their accumulation of technology and infrastructures. The technological knowledge and 
infrastructures accumulated by a country, i.e. its national innovation system, will, at the same 
time, determine the manufacturing productivity of the newly acquired technology, as well as 
its ability to obtain additional knowledge and develop further innovations. These premises 
are built into a stochastic endogenous growth model that will be used to analyze the expect-
ed technological evolution of a selected group of countries within the heterogeneous group 
composing the Euro-27 economic area. In particular, its dynamic implications regarding the 
economic evolution of the Baltic states within this group will be simulated using data from 
the latest Innovation Union Scoreboard (European Commission 2011). The main conclusion 
obtained states that technological laggard countries require exogenous and sufficiently large 
incentives in order to consistently develop their national systems of innovation through time. 
Otherwise, laggards will eventually stagnate both in technological and productivity terms as 
their national innovation systems become progressively obsolete.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces the model and derives the optimal 
behavior of [firms and] countries. Section 2 analyzes numerically these normative results 
and concludes. 
1. Cumulative technological processes
Consider an economic area consisting of two groups of countries and a finite number of 
firms per country. Countries are characterized by a unique industrial sector with a finite 
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number of firms in it. This unique sector may be intuitively identified with the national sys-
tem of innovation of each country, a concept developed by Lundvall (1988). Alternatively, 
we could generalize this setting allowing for several industrial sectors within each country. 
Increasing the number of industrial sectors would allow us to analyze the sectoral special-
ization of countries but would not affect the main results obtained while complicating the 
presentation considerably. 
The exchange rate is fixed equal to one and identical unitary prices are assumed in both 
groups of countries for the most technologically advanced good being produced. There are 
always N workers per firm in each country. That is, we will not be studying migratory patterns 
between countries or their consequences. The labor force is composed exclusively by skilled 
workers, who can be used to either innovate or manufacture, nsn and nsm, respectively, such 
that nsn + nsm = 1. However, human capital formation processes differ among countries, which 
constitutes a source of heterogeneity affecting their respective technological assimilation and 
subsequent growth patterns. 
If labor is used to manufacture it generates output per time period at a rate limited by the 
level of technological development achieved by the country:
 *
cλ
ξ =
λ
,  (1)
which reflects the distance existing among countries within a particular technological par-
adigm. That is, l* indicates the level of technological development necessary to generate 
the latest innovation available, i.e. the technological frontier, while cλ  stands for the level 
achieved by the country. If labor is used to innovate, it increases the probability of achieving 
a higher level of technological development the following period. All workers receive the 
same wage, w, independently of whether they are hired to manufacture or innovate. We will 
relax this latter assumption and analyze in detail its effect on the convergence process of 
countries in Section 2.
Time is continuous and measured by [discrete] innovations, such that one unit of time 
lasts as much as it is required for the next innovation to appear. Similarly to Aghion and 
Howitt (1992), if two innovations occur simultaneously it is assumed that continuity allows 
for them to be separated in two different units of time. At a given point in time, one of the 
firms within a country develops an innovation while the remaining ones behave as laggards. 
Contrary to the neoclassical economic literature on quality ladders (Grossman, Helpman 
1991), it will be assumed that all firms in both groups of countries gain immediate access to 
the most advanced production technology. As a result, all firms in both groups of countries 
charge the same quality adjusted [unitary] price for the latest state of the art good being 
produced. Innovation incentives are provided by infinitely elastic demand functions in each 
country that absorb all the production of the good per time period. Thus, innovations do 
not generate technological monopolies, but provide a factor productivity advantage over 
the rest of the firms. López et al. (2011) illustrate within a similarly constrained model the 
specific economic incentives of the firms located within both groups of countries to develop 
innovations.
The above simplifications have been imposed to emphasize the central role that national 
systems of innovation [total factor productivity differentials] have in the economic growth 
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process of countries (Furman et al. 2002). In particular, note that the ξ variable has been as-
sumed to include all financial, political and institutional factors affecting economic growth. 
Clearly, disaggregating ξ and allowing for frictions within any of these sectors or the linkages 
existing among them would lead to a decrease in the respective ξ values achieved by countries.
Countries must design their national systems of innovation by distributing their skilled 
labor force between manufacturing and innovation activities. In doing so, they maximize 
the expected flow of profits obtained from their firms limited by their respective levels of 
technological development:
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and ρ represents the rate of time preference for any given firm, assumed identical both among 
firms and between groups of countries. The level of technological development of a country 
determines the productivity of its labor for a given amount of physical capital K. Thus, the 
most productive technology available can only be exploited up to the limit imposed by the 
technological development level of the country. National systems of innovation, for which ξ 
is a proxy, constrain both the productivity of the production factors and the learning capac-
ity of skilled workers. The latter one is assumed to determine the innovation probability of 
a country within the current setting. 
Innovations are governed by a Poisson process whose arrival rate is defined by:
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where ( , )h hµ ξ = ξ  stands for the absorptive capacity of manufacturing workers, i.e. their 
ability to learn, with ( ) 0′µ ξ >  and h referring to the human capital accumulated by skilled 
workers. This learning function accounts for the fact that manufacturing workers are able to 
acquire the tacit knowledge implicit in the most technologically advanced good through both 
their capacity to learn and direct knowledge spillovers from innovator workers. Depending on 
the initial proportion of innovator workers and the absorptive capacity of the manufacturing 
ones, there will be a ξθ  proportion of innovator workers at the end of a given time period, 
determining the arrival probability of the next innovation. Henceforth, we will refer to the 
most technologically developed country as the innovator country. 
Equation (2) corresponds to a logistic learning function commonly used by the evolu-
tionary economic literature to analyze technological diffusion processes, see Aghion and 
Howitt (1999) and Geroski (2000) for a review of this literature. In this regard, ξθ  could be 
interpreted as an  incremental [cumulative] innovation process that becomes radical after 
reaching a value of one, giving place to a new technological cycle. Note also that this equation 
accounts for the learning process that takes place among workers but does not consider the 
one taking place among the firms located within a given industrial cluster, see Aghion and 
Howitt (1999) for a standard textbook approach to the latter. We omit this second process 
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here and assume that all effects regarding national innovation systems and their differences 
among countries are summarized by ξ.
The stochastic evolution of ξ per innovation unit of time depends on its current value and 
the Poisson process defining the innovation arrival rate. The increase in the level of techno-
logical development of a country if an innovation takes place among any of its firms equals:
 
( )d dzξξ = γξ − ξ ,   (3)
with 1γ >  and where the arrival rate of the corresponding Poisson process, zξ , is deter-
mined by ξθ . The stochastic differential equation defining the evolution of ξ among laggard 
countries reads as follows:
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(4)
where ξ  represents the technological development level of the innovator country. That is, 
all profits are assumed to be invested by each country in the improvement of their relative 
levels of technological development, with laggard countries being able to invest a smaller 
amount than the innovator one.  
Optimality
Countries have to distribute their resources between both labor types after each innovation 
takes place, while being constrained by their relative levels of ξ and ξθ . It should be noted 
that, even though manufacturing activities require human capital to exploit the leading 
technology, their effect on the production function of the country is only temporal. That 
is, for a country to generate the technological base required to grow through time it must 
innovate continuously. 
The Bellman equation defining the intertemporal optimization problem of a laggard 
country is given by:
 ,
( | )
( ) max ( | ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )],
( | )sn sm
sm
n n sm
sm
n
V n V V V
nξ ξ
 π ξ
ρ ξ = π ξ + ξ + θ γξ − ξ 
π ξ 
which allows for a direct comparison between the immediate benefits obtained from 
manufacturing activities and the expected benefits derived from innovation. Manufac-
turing activities generate immediate profits for the country, ( | )smnπ ξ , and lead to a de-
terministic increase in ξ, whose marginal value is accounted for by ( )Vξ ξ . However, the 
effect that manufacturing activities have on ξ via profits must be weighted with respect 
to the corresponding profits obtained by the innovator country, ( | )smnπ ξ . On the other 
hand, the expected benefits from developing an innovation consist of the Poisson arrival 
rate ξθ  times the value increase derived from the resulting change in ξ, [ ( ) ( )]V Vγξ − ξ . 
The above Bellman equation as well as the one corresponding to the most technologi-
cally developed country can be easily derived following the guidelines introduced in the 
Appendix B of López et al. (2011).
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The first order conditions defining the behavior of laggard countries can be simplified in 
order to obtain a break up rule determining the optimal allocation of skilled labor between 
manufacturing and innovative activities based on the respective values of ξ:
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The numerator within the right hand side of equation (5) corresponds to the instantaneous 
gains obtained from manufacturing activities. These gains are given by the marginal pro-
ductivity derived from using [an additional unit of] skilled labor in manufacturing activities 
and the marginal value generated by ξ relative to the manufacturing profits obtained by the 
innovator country. The denominator defines the expected gain (through the marginal prob-
ability increment induced by the respective learning processes) from using [an additional 
unit of] skilled labor in innovative activities. 
The optimal behavior of laggard countries as well as their technological evolution and 
corresponding growth processes are therefore determined by the relative strength of the 
manufacture and innovation enhancing effects defining the right hand side of equation (5). 
It should be noted that the ( )Vξ ξ term is not part of the first order conditions defining the 
behavior of the innovator country. These conditions lead to the following version of equa-
tion (5): 
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2. Empirical analysis and numerical simulations 
The optimization results obtained above are sensitive to the type of value function under 
consideration, that is, to the section of the technological cycle through which countries evolve. 
We use data from the Innovation Union Scoreboard 2011 to simulate the main implications 
derived from the current model for the development and innovation processes taking place 
among various reference countries within the Euro-27 group, with particular emphasis being 
placed on the Baltic states. We have concentrated on the countries determining the main 
industrial patterns within the European group, that is, the reference innovator, Sweden, 
together with Germany, plus the Baltic states, all compared to the average of the European 
group of 27.  The main data on the European countries under consideration is introduced 
in the second and third columns of Table Sets 1 to 3. The SII [summary innovation index] 
variable calculated by the Innovation Union Scoreboard will be used as a proxy for the quality 
and strength of the national innovation system of each country1. The values of the human 
resources variable refer to the human capital capacity of each country, which, at the same 
time, defines the absorption capacity of the labor force when determining the innovation 
probability of each country.
1 The calculation of and additional intuition regarding the summary innovation index variable can be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/innovation/facts-figures/scoreboards/index_en.htm 
260 I. Álvarez et al. Technological assimilation and divergence in times of crisis
Table Set 1. Basic Convergence Pattern [gξ = 1.5 ξ]
Concave value setting [V(x) = √x]
COUNTRY SII 2011 HUMAN RESOURCES nsn nsm qξ
EU27 0.539 0.563 0.0193 0.9807 0.2904
DE 0.700 0.613 0.0228 0.9772 0.6302
EE 0.496 0.575 0.0155 0.9845 0.2143
LV 0.230 0.451 –0.2808 1 2.8211e-004
LT 0.255 0.646 –0.0827 1 5.1908e-004
SE 0.755 0.893 0.0188 0.9812 0.9420
Convex value setting [V(x) = x2]
COUNTRY SII 2011 HUMAN RESOURCES nsn nsm qξ
EU27 0.539 0.563 0.0336 0.9664 0.4196
DE 0.700 0.613 0.0321 0.9679 0.7078
EE 0.496 0.575 0.0301 0.9699 0.3496
LV 0.230 0.451 –0.2701 1 2.8211e-004
LT 0.255 0.646 –0.4108 1 5.1908e-004
SE 0.755 0.893 0.0369 0.9631 0.9701
Country abbreviations: DE – Germany ; EE – Estonia; EU27 – EU27; LT – Lithuania; LV – Latvia; SE – Sweden
Table set 2. Catching-up Convergence Pattern [gξ = 0.755]
Concave value setting [V(x) = √x]
COUNTRY SII 2011 HUMAN RESOURCES nsn nsm qξ
EU27 0.539 0.563 0.0126 0.9874 0.2097
DE 0.700 0.613 0.0014 0.9986 0.0929
EE 0.496 0.575 0.0170 0.9830 0.2305
LV 0.230 0.451 -0.0541 1 2.8211e-004
LT 0.255 0.646 0.0356 0.9644 0.1609
SE 0.755 0.893 0.0188 0.9812 0.9420
Convex value setting [V(x) = x2]
COUNTRY SII 2011 HUMAN RESOURCES nsn nsm qξ
EU27 0.539 0.563 0.0234 0.9766 0.3325
DE 0.700 0.613 0.0028 0.9972 0.1702
EE 0.496 0.575 0.0325 0.9675 0.3678
LV 0.230 0.451 0.1812 0.8188 0.3844
LT 0.255 0.646 0.1590 0.8410 0.4954
SE 0.755 0.893 0.0369 0.9631 0.9701
Country abbreviations: DE – Germany ; EE – Estonia; EU27 – EU27; LT – Lithuania; LV – Latvia; SE – Sweden
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Table set 3. Full Catching-up Convergence Pattern [gξ = 2 × 0.755 = 1.51]
Concave value setting [V(x) = √x]
COUNTRY SII 2011 HUMAN RESOURCES nsn nsm qξ
EU27 0.539 0.563 0.0684 0.9316 0.6042
DE 0.700 0.613 0.0386 0.9614 0.7457
EE 0.496 0.575 0.0760 0.9240 0.5876
LV 0.230 0.451 0.1137 0.8863 0.2658
LT 0.255 0.646 0.1381 0.8619 0.4542
SE 0.755 0.893 0.0259 0.9741 0.9575
Convex value setting [V(x) = x2]
COUNTRY SII 2011 HUMAN RESOURCES nsn nsm qξ
EU27 0.539 0.563 0.1371 0.8629 0.7676
DE 0.700 0.613 0.0618 0.9382 0.8279
EE 0.496 0.575 0.1616 0.8384 0.7695
LV 0.230 0.451 0.7129 0.2871 0.8751
LT 0.255 0.646 0.5091 0.4909 0.8434
SE 0.755 0.893 0.0576 0.9424 0.9811
Country abbreviations: DE – Germany ; EE – Estonia; EU27 – EU27; LT – Lithuania; LV – Latvia; SE – Sweden
The fourth and fifth columns of each table set follow from solving the corresponding 
first order conditions of the current model for each country. The following values have been 
fixed through all the numerical simulations: K=1, N=10 and α = 0.3. These values have been 
chosen in order to simplify the presentation and do not affect the main results obtained. Two 
main remarks are however due. First, the most technologically developed country within the 
Euro-27 group is Sweden, i.e. it has the highest SII and Human Resources values combined, 
and has therefore been used as the main convergence reference. Second, the set of solutions 
to the first order conditions delivers both rational and irrational values. We have chosen 
and reported the highest one within the former group, even in the case when all the values 
obtained are negative. However, whenever the optimal value of nsn is negative, we have as-
signed the corresponding country a value of 0.0001 in order to allow for comparability among 
the probabilities within the positive real quadrant. It should be noted that these numerical 
results imply that the corresponding countries will be following suboptimal policies. That is, 
these countries are forced to allocate too high a proportion of workers to innovative activi-
ties given their underdeveloped innovation systems. This absence of innovation incentives 
will deepen the divergent gap with respect to the innovator countries. Such a  result will be 
evident in the simulations displaying the evolution of the innovation probabilities where 
optimal negative values are initially obtained for Latvia and Lithuania, with particular em-
phasis on the former one.
Each set of tables represents concave and convex functional forms accounting for different 
value gains resulting from successful innovations. The first set of tables corresponds to the 
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setting where each innovator country improves the state of its national innovation system 
by 1.5 times its pre-innovation level. That is, the improvements derived from an innovation 
are constrained by the level of ξ achieved by each country. Figure 1 illustrates the substantial 
differences existing between the European innovator leader and the technological laggards, 
i.e. Latvia and Lithuania, in terms of innovation incentives and probabilities. The reward 
structures derived from the respective value functions do not suffice to improve the innova-
tion capacity of  laggards, which falls considerably behind those of the main innovator and 
the Euro-27 average. Furthermore, in order to account for the expected evolution of the in-
novation probabilities [and capacities] of countries in between innovations we have defined 
them as cumulative dynamical variables, i.e. we have added time, t, to the definition of the 
ξθ  learning function. In this regard, Figure 2 represents the large divergence in innovation 
[cumulative] probability terms existing between the respective countries. 
Fig. 1. Innovation probability: convex value setting [gξ = 1.5 ξ]
Fig. 2. Innovation probabilities evolving: concave value setting [gξ = 1.5 ξ]
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The remaining simulations have been included to illustrate the fundamental idea that 
national systems of innovation evolve cumulatively and must therefore be built and careful-
ly developed through time. Consider the case presented in the second set of tables, where 
laggards reach the technological development level of the reference innovator country, i.e. 
0.755, after developing an innovation. Sweden would reach 1.5 times its pre-innovation level 
if it develops an innovation, as was the case in the previous setting. The resulting increase 
in the innovation incentives of technological laggards would lead them to allocate a larger 
proportion of their resources to innovative  activities, an effect illustrated and emphasized 
by the existing differences between the convex and concave settings represented in Figures 3 
and 4, respectively. 
Fig. 3. Innovation probability: convex value setting [gξ = 0.755]
Fig. 4. Innovation probabilities evolving: concave  
value setting [gξ = 0.755]
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A similar intuition applies to the simulations described in the third set of tables, where 
innovators experience an increase in their factor productivity identical to that of Sweden when 
g = 2. That is, if a country generates an innovation, its level of technological development 
increases to a value of 1.51, i.e. the level that would be attained by Sweden after innovating 
when g = 2. This final setting provides the largest innovation incentives to laggard countries, 
as can be directly inferred from Figures 5 and 6. This is particularly the case within the con-
vex value scenario, where innovation incentives lead both laggards to achieve an innovation 
probability higher than 80%.
Fig. 5. Innovation probability: convex value setting [gξ = 2 × 0.755 = 1.51]
Fig. 6. Innovation probabilities evolving: concave  
value setting [gξ = 2 × 0.755 = 1.51]
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Alternative model specifications and divergent patterns
Among the convergence-prone assumptions imposed when defining the current model, the 
absence of migration and subsequent wage simplifications deserve some additional analysis. 
The wages received by the skilled workers have been assumed to be identical independently 
of whether they are used in manufacturing or innovative activities. The intuition behind this 
assumption implies that since all workers are endowed with and provide the same amount 
of human capital, their rewards should be identical independently of the use given to them 
within a country. Moreover, the contribution of the manufacturing workers to the profits of 
a country is deterministic, while the innovative labor provides a stochastic expected return, 
which is based on the level of technological development of the country, a factor affecting 
the relative incentives of the country to assign labor to such an activity. 
In order to verify the validity of our results two main variations of the model in terms of 
the wage received by skilled workers will be analyzed. 
The first one implies allowing for migration flows to take place between both groups of 
countries. In this case, we should consider completely unrelated wages for skilled innovator 
and manufacture workers, wsn and wsm, respectively. Both wages can be shown to increase in 
the level of technological development of a country. This result would shift the focus of the 
paper to the subsequent migration flows expected to be observed from the laggards to the 
most technologically developed country. As a result, laggards would be forced to decrease 
the amount (or proportion) of workers in both the innovation and manufacturing sectors in 
order to increment their productivity and compensate for the otherwise lower wages paid to 
their skilled labor. The resulting lower amounts of labor within the laggard countries would 
lead to lower profits and a lower innovation probability.
The second variation allows us to analyze in more detail the generation of innovation 
incentives and differential evolving patterns defined by the model. This second variation 
consists of making the wages of the innovative workers depend directly on the technological 
development level of the country. This dependence has already been implicitly considered 
through the innovation arrival probability, on which the expected return form innovative 
activities and the optimal allocation of labor are based. However, wages could be assumed to 
depend explicitly on ξ. In particular, the same type of analysis performed through the paper 
could be redone in terms of wsn = j ξ wsm, with j ∈ (0, ∞]. For expositional simplicity, we 
will assume that j = 2 through the following set of simulations. The consequences for con-
vergence from modifying this value will become clear through the analysis of the numerical 
results. The corresponding optimality condition of this alternative model would be given by: 
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and similarly for the innovator country. In this alternative scenario, the direct dependence 
of wsn on ξ leads to a higher proportion of [now relatively cheaper] workers being dedicated 
to innovative activities among the laggards. Note, however, that this is not sufficient per se 
to increase the innovation probability of the laggards, which depends also on ξ, and further 
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incentives in terms of higher returns from innovation are required for laggards to experience 
a substantial increment in their innovation probabilities, as Figures 8 and 9 below illustrate. 
For comparability purposes with Figures 2, 4 and 6, the following figures concentrate on the 
concave value setting, with V(x) = √x.
Fig. 7. Innovation probabilities evolving: concave  
value setting [gξ = 1.5 ξ]
Fig. 8. Innovation probabilities evolving: concave  
value setting [gξ = 0.755]
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Fig. 9. Innovation probabilities evolving: concave  
value setting [gξ = 2 × 0.755 = 1.51]
These figures illustrate how when wages are allowed to depend directly on ξ, there is 
an increment in the incentives of the laggards to dedicate more, and now cheaper, labor 
to innovative activities. Thus, our original specification leads to an overpayment of the 
skilled innovative labor and a decrease in the optimal proportion allocated to these activi-
ties among laggard countries. However, the gains from innovative activities are based on a 
cumulative process and a developed technological base in terms of both human capital and 
infrastructures is required for a country to further develop its national system of innova-
tion. As a result, the low levels of technological development exhibited by the laggards, with 
particular emphasis on Latvia and Lithuania, imply that these countries will not dedicate 
their resources to innovative [and R&D] activities unless the required return incentives are 
provided. This effect becomes particularly evident when comparing the Basic Convergence 
Pattern presented in Figure 7 with the increment in the return incentives from innova-
tion introduced in Figures 8 and 9 that represent the Catching-up and Full Catching-up 
Convergence Patterns, respectively.  
Conclusions and policy implications
The importance of a developed national system of innovation for economic growth has been 
repeatedly emphasized both formally and empirically (Archibugi, Coco 2005; Castellacci, 
Archibugi 2008). However, as illustrated by the current model, the incentives to continuously 
develop one remain constrained by its current level. On their own, laggard countries are 
barely motivated by the expected returns obtained from an innovation. Thus, a sufficiently 
large return must be achievable in order for the laggards to start shifting resources towards 
the innovation, as opposed to the manufacturing, side of the system. Absent these incentives, 
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we should expect to observe the long run economic stagnation of the corresponding group 
of [laggard] countries, as technologically developed innovators continue to improve their 
[cumulative] innovation systems. Note that cumulative divergences are exacerbated when 
laggards remain within the concave section of the technological cycle while the innovator 
enters the convex one, which provides relatively higher innovation incentives.
The fact of being a producer of knowledge, i.e. developing the national system of inno-
vation, increments both the productivity of the manufacturing labor and the probability of 
developing an innovation within a given country. Thus, even though the most advanced 
technology is available to all countries, its productivity as well as the innovation probability 
and absorptive capacity of workers depend on the incentives of countries to invest in knowl-
edge creation, which differ based on the rewards from innovation and the technological 
development level of each country. 
The main welfare consequence derived from the accumulation of knowledge and tech-
nology within a given country should therefore be described in terms of its profits relative 
to the laggard ones. The following Eurostat-based Figures 10 and 11 illustrate this point. We 
are aware of the multiple factors affecting the variables presented in these figures and do not 
want to imply the existence of direct causality between them. However, the pictures provided 
by the data support the main conclusions of the model regarding the incentives of countries 
to invest in the development of their national systems of innovation.
Net financial assets encompass the difference between total financial assets and total 
liabilities. More details on the definitions of financial assets and liabilities, their categories 
and sub-categories are provided in http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/EN/
nasa_f_bs_esms.htm.
Fig. 10. [Non-consolidated] net financial assets as a percentage of GDP
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Fig. 11. Total intramural R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP
Eurostat statistics on R&D expenditure are compiled using the guidelines laid out in the 
Frascati Manual. Refer to http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/EN/rd_esms.htm 
for additional information regarding this variable and its calculation.
Thus, even though the assumptions imposed in the current paper define an idealistic 
version of technological cooperation at the European level, additional innovation incentives 
are required for laggards to develop their national innovation systems. The main conclusion 
that follows from the paper in policy terms is that monetary incentives [in the form of direct 
transfers] alone may not be sufficient for laggard countries to increase the resources dedicated 
to innovative activities, as the previous figures illustrate. Monetary transfers may be used 
to ameliorate the welfare differences with the main innovators, but unless the rewards from 
innovation are directly shared in terms of system development and evolution, disparities will 
persist, even within a convergence-prone setting.
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